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Proof. Consider the matching problem (F, M, ) with the following preference lists:
The only stable matching µ * for (F, M, ) is given by µ * (A, B, C) = (b, a, c). This is easily verified using the Gale-Shapley algorithm by observing that the male and female optimal solutions are identical. However, one can confirm that it does not satisfy Condition 1 by considering all possible orderings of F and M. An easier way to see that Condition 1 is not satisfied is by observing that none of the females get their top preference in the only stable matching. Therefore, none of the females can be first in the ordering (X i ) from Condition 1. Furthermore, there also exists a ring (A, a, B, b) which, together with Lemma 2 from [1] , shows that Condition 1 cannot be satisfied for this example.
The proof of Lemma 6 in Eeckhout [1] argued that if Condition 1 is violated then either µ * is not an equilibrium or there exists µ = µ * that is also an equilibrium. The author's statement that if b A a and/or B a A and the remaining conditions of Condition 1 hold then µ (A, B, C) = (b, a, c) ∈ S, is not true. Consider, for example, the following preference lists: (b, a, c) A , (b, c, a) Remark 3 Since none of females get their most preferred partners in the only stable matching in the example provided above, it is clear that Corollary 7 in Eeckhout [1] is also incorrect.
